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Cosmology and Metanoia:
A Buddhist Path to Process Thought for the West
James Fredericks
In recent memory, much worthwhile literature has appeared regard­
ing the complexities of Alfred North Whitehead's relationship to Bud­
dhist metaphysics. Without doubt, process thought has served as a 
fruitful path for Western scholars in their efforts to gain a more refined 
appreciation of the cultural vision and religious insight of the East. 
Generally, this literature presumes that the strangeness of Buddhist 
thought to the West can be overcome, or at least lessened, by inter­
preting it with a process metaphysics. According to this interpretive 
strategy, in which the familiar is used to render the exotic more 
understandable, Whitehead’s process metaphysics serves as a heuristic 
device for overcoming the alien character of Buddhist thought to the 
West. While acknowledging the usefulness of this approach, it should 
be noted that the strategy presupposes that Whitehead’s thought is in 
fact no stranger to the Western intellectual tradition. I believe this 
presupposition needs to be called into question.
In presuming Whitehead’s familiarity to and compatibility with the 
West, his interpreters overlook an opportunity for appreciating process 
thought as a critique of modernity arising from a religious standpoint 
beyond it. With this missed opportunity in mind, I propose another 
route which reverses the usual approach of using process thought to in­
terpret Buddhism. Given the current results of inter-religious dialogue, 
it might now be possible to use our understanding of Buddhist religious 
experience to interpret the strangeness and virtually unprecedented 
character of Whitehead’s metaphysics to the West. In effect, Buddhism 
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might offer a path through which the West might make Whitehead’s 
process cosmology its own. The reflections that follow are guided by 
two hunches. First, although this new approach requires a religious 
reading of Whitehead, it is a reading that is rooted in a Buddhist, not a 
Christian cosmology. Second, I believe this approach will put us in a 
better position to appreciate process thought not only as a critique of 
modernity, but as a religious vision which opens up post-modern 
religious possibilities for both Christianity and Buddhism.
These reflections are organized as follows: (1) an appreciation of the 
alien character of Whitehead’s cosmology to the Weltanschauung of 
traditional Christian theism and the presuppositions of the Enlighten­
ment, (2) an argument for recognizing the Buddhist warrants for 
Whitehead’s cosmology by means of a brief comparison of Alfred 
North Whitehead with Nishida Kitard, and (3) a religious interpreta­
tion of Whitehead’s cosmology based on the debate between Tanabe 
Hajime and Nishida KitarO on the meaning of absolute nothingness.
I
God and the world stand over against each other, expressing 
the final metaphysical truth that appetitive vision and physi­
cal enjoyment have equal claim to priority in creation. But no 
two actual entities can be torn apart: each is all in all. Thus 
each temporal occasion embodies God, and is embodied in 
God. In God’s nature, permanence is primordial and flux is 
derivative from the world: in the World’s nature, flux is 
primordial and permanence is derivative from God. Also the 
World’s nature is a primordial datum for God; and God’s 
nature is a primordial datum for the World. Creation achieve 
the reconciliation of permanence and flux when it has reached 
its final term which is everlastingness—the Apotheosis of the 
World.1
1 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: Macmillan, 1929), p. 
529.
These words, taken from the final pages of Process and Reality, are 
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confounding for their seeming lack of consistency with the elaborate 
metaphysical itinerarium which precedes them, yet arresting for the 
compelling religious vision they express. It is in vain that we search for 
a foundation or even an anticipation of this thought in the rationalism 
of the West’s Enlightenment. Nevertheless, the power of the religious 
vision expressed herein is no more alien to the West’s intellectual 
heritage than the strangeness of Jesus’ proclamation that the Kingdom 
of God is at hand. It is the very strangeness of this vision that promises 
to Christianity a restoration of what the modern spirit has taken from 
it: the lived sense of the immediacy of the divine to the world and the 
fulfillment of time in this immediacy.2
2 Thomas Altizer, “The Buddhist Ground of Whitehead’s God,” Process Studies 5/ 
4 (1975): 227-236.
’ Alfred North Whitehead, Retigion in the Making (New York: Meridian Books, 
1960), p. 50.
4 Ibid., p. 51.
Both his secular critics and Christian theologians have interpreted 
the late Whitehead as an apologist for Christianity. Certainly by the 
time of the writing of Process and Reality God has become a para­
mount issue for his metaphysics. How can contemporary Christianity, 
which has yet to overcome fully Pascal’s modem dichotomy of the 
philosophical and religious meaning of the divine, affirm Whitehead’s 
metaphysical God as the living God? The Christian theological tra­
dition, quite as much as modern secular thought, struggles with the 
task of incorporating Whitehead’s religious vision into its own. If, 
as Whitehead claims, Buddhism is “a metaphysics generating a reli­
gion,”3 then Christianity must be recognized as a religion peren­
nially in search of a metaphysics, and for this reason, a religion whose 
lack of an adequate metaphysical conception of God is both the index 
of its incompleteness and the hallmark of its own unsettled religiosity. 
Instead of metaphysics, Christianity looks to the “tremendous fact”4 of 
Christ; a fact that can be generated from neither neo-Platonic nor any 
other brand of metaphysics; a fact that ultimately defeats metaphysics 
by its eternal unwillingness to be bound by conceptualization. If this 
“tremendous fact” resists any attempt at being encompassed within 
the horizon of the Western metaphysical tradition (as Whitehead 
argues), might its religious meaning be interpreted from within the in­
tellectual horizon of the East?
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This would at first seem to be an unlikely possibility. In Whitehead’s 
interpretation, Buddhism is “the most colossal example in history of 
applied metaphysics” the defect of which is that a metaphysical system 
is “a neat little system of thought, which thereby over-simplifies its ex­
pression of the world.”5 In this respect, it is Christianity and not Bud­
dhism which should be more open to the historical novelty of “fact.” 
Yet “fact,” for Whitehead, refers not only to the novelty of the Christ- 
event asserted by Christian belief, but carries with it a peculiar meaning 
that lays claim to a privileged position within his metaphysics. After 
arguing that any “summary conclusion” regarding the meaning of the 
order of nature (such as “The Absolute,” “Brahma,” or “God”) 
jumps from the conviction about the existence of order to “the easy 
assumption that there is an ultimate reality which, in some unexplained 
way, is to be appealed to for the removal of perplexity,” Whitehead 
offers the intriguing comment that this “summary conclusion” con­
stitutes “the great refusal of rationality to assert its rights.” Instead, he 
suggests that “the sheer statement, of what things are, may contain 
elements explanatory of why things are.”6
5 Ibid., p. 50.
6 Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modem World (new York: Free Press, 
1925), p. 92.
’ Ibid., p. 94.
More simply put, Whitehead insists that every fact has its own intrin­
sic reality, or value.
Realization therefore is in itself the attainment of value. But 
there is no such thing as mere value. Value is the outcome of 
limitation. The definite finite entity is the selected mode which 
is the shaping of attainment; apart from such shaping into 
individual matter of fact there is no attainment. The mere 
fusion of all that there is would be the nonentity of in­
definiteness. The salvation of reality is in its obstinate, ir­
reducible, matter-of-fact entities, which are limited to be no 
other than themselves, (emphasis mine)7
Perhaps no other aspect of Whitehead’s thought registers with more 
strangeness than his assertion of the salvific meaning of “obstinate, ir­
reducible, matter-of-fact entities.” This assertion, however, is alien
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not only to the ethical monotheism of Western Christianity. By wed­
ding “fact” to “value,” Whitehead unites what the rationalism of the 
Enlightenment divides. It is, in effect, a critique of modernity from a 
standpoint foreign to it?
Whitehead’s debt to Buddhist thought is a problem that will con­
tinue to be debated. However, not only their affinities, but also their 
multiple differences testify to his relationship with the Buddhist 
religion vision. The soteriology of matter-of-fact entities is but one ex­
ample. This being the case, the relationship of Whitehead’s process 
metaphysics to the Buddhist philosophy of Nishida KitarO is merits our 
attention.
II
Nishida and Whitehead present cosmologies of such daunting com­
plexity that, in trying to compare them, only a sketch of the manifold 
problems for interpretation can be offered here. Two issues suggest 
themselves for special attention: (1) their preference for the “im­
mediacy” of concrete experience in developing a metaphysics, and (2) 
the quality of “totality” in their respective cosmologies.
Both Nishida and Whitehead are concerned with the immediacy of 
concrete experience as a metaphysical underpinning for cosmology. 
Whitehead, addressing the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness,” 
argues against the “abstractions” of being and substance in favor of a 
metaphysics of “presentational immediacy.” As this concept holds cer­
tain affinities with Nishida’s views regarding “pure experience,” so 
also Whitehead’s concern with the fallacy of misplaced concreteness 
parallels in some respects Nishida’s preoccupation with an “existential 
matrix ontology.”8 9 Experience is factorable into different levels 
(“worlds”) based on an ontology of latticing apriorities of experiential 
concreteness. Most abstract are the objects of the physical world; in-
8 For a discussion of the post-modern possibilities of Whitehead’s thought, see 
Thomas Altizer, “The Buddhist Ground of Whitehead’s God,” Process Studies 5/4 
(1975): 227-236.
9 The phrase is taken from the analysis of David Dilworth. See his “Introduction: 
Nishida’s Critique of Religious Consciousness,” in Nishida Kitaro, Last Writings 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), p. 14.
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creasingly concrete (experientially) and increasingly self-contradictory 
(logically) are the biological world and the historical world. The most 
concrete and self-contradictory level of all is the “place of absolute 
nothingness* * (mu no basho). Clearly Nishida shared Whitehead’s 
dissatisfaction with the “misplaced concreteness” of being and 
substance and looked for an alternative in the immediacy of concrete 
experience.10
10 These similarities, however, should not obscure several important differences 
which distinguish these two thinkers on the issue of immediacy. Nishida holds that not 
only being, but dynamism as well must be counted as abstractions arising from the 
ultimate apriority of absolute nothingness. In contrast, Whitehead recognizes beings as 
an abstraction, but not dynamism. In this respect, it would seem that Whitehead’s no­
tion of process is not fully congruent with Nishida’s views regarding the “eternal 
now.”
11 Hatarakumono kara miru mono e (From the Acting to the Seeing) in Nishida 
KitarQ Zensha 4:207.
12 Alfred North Whitehead, Science in the Modern World, p. 133.
If “immediacy” is a shared value in their respective metaphysics, the 
notion of “totality” is a common characteristic of their respective 
cosmologies. This is apparent in a comparison of Whitehead’s notion 
of process and Nishida’s views regarding the “place of absolute 
nothingness.” Both Nishida and Whitehead attempt to account for 
historical reality with categories which escape the presuppositions of 
both Aristotelian logic and Hegelian dialectics. In Nishida’s case, this 
means that the historical world of “action” arises from the “place” of 
absolute nothingness, which constitutes “the matrix of all becoming.” 
Within this matrix, “the universal vanishes and at the same time there 
is immediate transparency from particular to particular.”11 Whitehead 
understands “process” as an ongoing “concrescence of prehensions.” 
This leads him to make the following extraordinary claim:
In a certain sense, everything is everywhere in all times. For 
every location involves an aspect of itself in every other loca­
tion. Thus every spacio-temporal standpoint mirrors the 
world.12
Both Nishida and Whitehead are in agreement that every event is vir­
tually present in every other event. Whitehead seems to affirm the “im­
mediate transparency from particular to particular,” when he claims 
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that “each is all in all.”13 14Nishida extrapolates his understanding of the 
interpenetration of all implied by his matrix ontology with Nicholas of 
Cusa’s image of the infinite circle whose center is everywhere. Both im­
ages suggest what might be called a “cosmology of totality** in which 
all dualism and distinction are overcome by the coincidence of op­
posites. This feature common to their respective cosmologies can be 
clearly seen in their way of addressing the problem of the relationship 
between God and the world.
13 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 529.
14 Nishida Kitaro, Last Writings, p. 69.
15 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 531.
In his final essay, “The Logic of Place and the Religious World­
view,” Nishida clarifies his understanding of God and the world as a 
“contradictory self-identity” (mujunteki jikodOitsu)" Transcend­
ence and immanence, absolute and relative, permanence and flux, God 
and creature: all the differentiations that reason imposes on “pure ex­
perience” are unified into a paradoxical totality of self-identity when 
grounded in the place of absolute nothingness. Somewhat similarly, 
Whitehead, while addressing the problem of the “dipolarity” of God, 
comments:
All opposites are elements in the nature of things, and are in­
corrigibly there. The concept of God is the way in which we 
understand this incredible fact—that what cannot be, yet is.15
Whitehead’s position approaches Nishida’s cosmology in that the 
totality and immediacy of God and world can be apprehended only in 
the abandoning of object-logic and its principles of non-contradiction 
and simple self-identity. Does not Whitehead’s notion of the “salva­
tion of reality by the co-inherence of fact and value” express the 
“suchness” and “original naturalness” (Jinen) of God and the world 
as much as Nishida’s position regarding the “eschatology of the or­
dinary” reflects Whitehead’s soteriology of the “obstinate, irreducible 
matter of fact entity”? In order to defend this vision of the mutual em­
bodiment of God and world, Whitehead and Nishida are required to 
sustain an uncompromised non-dualism which presupposes the coin­
cidence of opposites as its logical form. If this is in fact the case, then 
we must also ask if Whitehead does not approximate Nishida’s notion 
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of absolute nothingness in his process cosmology.16 For both Nishida 
and Whitehead, nature and consciousness, God and world no longer 
form a dualism of subject and object. Both elements are immediately 
apprehended in an encompassing “total presence.”17 It is only within 
this totality, the “place” wherein every contradiction comes to be seen 
as a paradoxical self-identity, that the salvation of reality can be 
discerned in the matter-of-fact.
16 As with the suspicion of abstraction and the preference for a concrete logic, the 
similiarities to be noted between “process” and “place” should not be allowed to 
obscure a significant difference distinguishing Whitehead from Nishida. Following 
Charles Hartshorne, it should be remembered that in Whitehead’s understanding of 
the process theory of creativity, “universal relativity” implies an asymmetrical (one­
way) causality in which events flow from past into present. See Charles Hartshorne, 
Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1970), pp. 205- 
26. Interpenetration is emergent: antecedents lead to new actualities because con­
crescence (creative synthesis) takes novelty as its principle. In Nishida’s case, 
“unhindered interpenetration” is construed rather differently. Paraphrasing Hart­
shorne, it might be described as a symmetrical causality in which past, present and 
future events affect one another simultaneously. Addressing this problem, Abe Masao 
observes that in place of the uni-directional, successive and “non-reciprocal” (sym­
metrical) character of creativity in Whitehead’s scheme, Nishida is unwilling to assign 
any priority to conjunction over disjunction in articulating his understanding of 
historical action in absolute nothingness. The world of historical action therefore is en­
tirely asymmetrical: past, present and future mutually arise out of the “eternal now.” 
See Abe Masao, “Philosophy, Religion and Aesthetics in Nishida and Whitehead,” in 
The Eastern Buddhist, 22/2 (1987): 58. While Whitehead’s “togetherness” is emergent 
and novel, Nishida’s “eternal now” constitutes the simultaneity of the “unhindered in­
terpenetration of particular and particular” of Kegon (Hua-yen) Buddhism. For a de­
tailed and carefully drawn analysis of this problem vis-a-vis Hua-yen Buddhism, see 
Steve Odin, “The Metaphysics of Cumulative Penetration: Process Theory and Hua- 
yen Buddhism,” in Process Studies 11/2 (1981): 65-82.
Hartshorne’s distinction between symmetrical and asymmetrical relativity and Abe’s 
views regarding non-reciprocal and reciprocal causality may not be the final word on 
this complex problem. To my knowledge, no commentator has exhausted the 
possibilities attending Nishida’s views regarding creativity. In the final period of his 
writings, addressing himself specifically to the problem of “action” in the historical 
world, Nishida insisted that historical experience involved a movement “from the 
created to the creating.” This position seems to mitigate somewhat a strictly asym- 
metrical/non-reciprocal interpretation of historical “action” in Nishida’s thought.
17 Thomas Altizer, “The Buddhist Ground of Whitehead’s God,” p. 233.
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III
Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962), Nishida’s younger protege at Kyoto Im­
perial University, offers a “minority report” on the meaning of ab­
solute nothingness. Their collaboration dates from roughly 1911 and 
continued in Kyoto after Tanabe’s studies in Germany with Husserl 
and Heidegger. However, beginning with his lectures in 1930, Tanabe 
became increasingly critical of the Nishida tetsugaku, especially the no­
tion of “place” as a metaphor for absolute nothingness. During the 
war period (1941-1945), Tanabe underwent a personal crisis which led 
tp a painful and gradual metanoia that profoundly transformed his un­
derstanding of philosophy. Starting in 1941 (through the good offices 
of his student, Takeuchi Yoshinori) the influence of Pure Land Bud­
dhist texts is increasingly discernable in his lectures. These develop­
ments led to the publication in 1946 of Philosophy as Metanoetics 
(Zangedo toshite no tetsugaku).19 Here Tanabe mounts a major criti­
cism of Nishida’s position regarding absolute nothingness which has 
issued in a debate that continues to this day.
Although Tanabe’s break with Nishida can be traced (in print at 
least) from 1930, the publication of Philosophy as Metanoetics in 1946 
presents a mature crystallization of his position vis-a-vis the Nishida te­
tsugaku. In this work, Tanabe mounts a philosophy of religion from 
an existential orientation which includes critical commentaries on 
Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Pascal, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Heidegger 
(and the omnipresent but never mentioned Nishida), guided by the 
Pure Land teachings of Shinran (1173-1262).
Throughout the work, Tanabe insists that his aim is not to offer a 
philosophical reflection about the meaning of repentance (zange), but 
rather to argue that philosophy itself necessarily entails repentance, 
conversion, and the eventual transformation of subjectivity. Only the 
extent that speculation leads to this transformation can it rightly be 
called a philosophy. Accordingly, the path of repentance, or “metano-
11 Tanabe Hajime, Philosophy as Metanoetics (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, Takeuchi Yoshinori trans., 1986). The original Japanese edition was published 
by Iwanami Shoten in April of 1946.
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etics” (zangedO) is not merely one philosophy among others, but the 
only possible philosophy.
“Metanoetics” carries the sense of “meta-noetics,” denoting 
philologically a transcending of noetics, or in other words, a 
transcending of metaphysical philosophy based on contempla­
tion or intellectual intuition achieved by the use of reason.19
In effect, Tanabe is envisioning a radical transformation of philosophy 
as a purely rational and academic discipline. A proper understanding 
of meta-noesis leads neither to what he terms “ordinary mysticism” 
nor to yet another philosophy based on the “self-power” (Jiriki) of 
reason for criticism, but rather a “philosophy that is not a philoso­
phy;” viz. a discourse completely reoriented by the religious experience 
of transformation by “other-power” (tariki). Thus philosophy itself, 
indeed, the only possible philosophy, is the discourse which results 
from the awakening of subjectivity through graced transformation 
and conversion. Tetsugaku, in other words, is the path of metanoia, 
zangedb.
Tanabe develops the logic of metanoetics, what he calls the “ab­
solute critique,” by means of a commentary on Kant’s First Critique 
and Hegel’s response to it.20 Pure reason seeks to establish itself as ab­
solute knowledge about reality. Kant recognized the disruption of this 
quest in his discussion of the antinomies of pure reason. In order to ex­
empt pure reason from self-contradiction, Kant was required to adopt 
an agnosticism regarding the noumena, which led to the exclusion of 
speculative metaphysics and theology from the realm of pure reason. 
Hegel also recognized this disruption of reason in the antinomies but, 
unlike Kant, attempted to reestablish reason (and thereby metaphys­
ics) dialectically by means of a conceptual Aufhebung. Tanabe rejects 
both Kant’s agnosticism and Hegel’s Aufhebung as different solutions 
which share in the same inappropriate aim of protecting reason from 
its own innate self-contradiction. Instead, he heightens the problem 
by denying outright pure reason’s ability to criticize itself radically 
(moving beyond Kant) as well as its ability to overcome antinomy 
with dialectics (against Hegel’s solution). The problem of the limits of
” Ibid., p. 2.
20 Ibid., pp. 36-57. 
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pure reason is not one of eliminating contradiction, but recognizing 
reality's profound and abiding self-contradiction. Kantian critical 
philosophy is not radical enough to meet the requirements of Tanabe's 
vision of a transformed philosophical discourse, due to Kant's Enlight­
enment presuppositions, the reason that criticizes is never required to 
submit itself to criticism. In effect, the transcendental ego remains 
intact and reason is allowed to retain for itself the principle of non­
contradiction.
In contrast to Kant's attempt to preserve reason’s “self-power” for 
criticism and non-contradiction, Tanabe calls reason to “awaken to 
itself’ and its inherent self-contradiction by reaching toward greater 
self-consciousness.
Just as self-awareness must break through itself by awakening 
to a consciousness of nothingness, so must the self-criticism 
of reason run aground on the impassable antinomies of the 
one and the many, the whole and the individual, infinity and 
finitude, determinacy and spontaneity, necessity and freedom. 
Criticism has no alternative but to surrender itself to this cri­
sis of self-disruption, and to overcome it by allowing itself 
to be shattered to pieces.21
21 Ibid., p. 38.
Thus far, Tanabe has led us no further than the wastelands of moder­
nity’s unbridled criticism. His purpose, however, is not modern in this 
sense. Given his/a/YA that critical reason can be “awakened” through 
its zange and transformed through tariki, Tanabe offers a critique of 
reason that is religious, and I believe, post-modern. If not the synthesis 
of the Hegelian Aufhebung, in what sense is “allowing itself to be shat­
tered to pieces” also an overcoming of reason's absolute disruption?
It is both a matter of destiny and ultimate truth that in the pur­
suit of full autonomy, reason must finally break down. But 
where can reason, shattered and sunk into sheer nothingness, 
find a foothold from which to break out of its crisis by break­
ing through itself, from which to be transformed and resur­
rected from nothingness to new being? . . . The depths of 
reality as a whole can be fathomed only when we are con­
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vinced that the absolute consists solely in the transforma­
tive power of absolute nothingness.22
22 Ibid., p. 39.
25 Ibid., pp. 151-192.
Therefore Kant’s critique of reason is not the ultimate standpoint for 
philosophy, but rather a compromise that leaves the subject intact. 
Kantian criticism and Hegelian dialectic presume that the subject is a 
substance and therefore must cling to the principle of non-contradic­
tion. Branding this type of reason the “logic of self-identity” and re­
jecting the discourse based on it as a “self-power” (Jiriki) philoso­
phy, Tanabe offers in its place the “absolute critique” in which reason 
“dies’ by surrendering to its innate self-contradiction in the the hope 
of “rising” through the transformative grace of absolute nothingness 
experienced as other-power (tariki).
Implicit in his criticism of Kant and Hegel, however, is a criticism of 
Nishida. Tanabe pointedly rejects the notion that absolute nothingness 
can be realized in an aesthetic intuition into an experiential immediacy 
prior to the opposition of subject and object. True nothingness is not a 
“pure experience,” but rather the transforming event of “other- 
power.” Were the absolute to “exist” immediately (and thereby for it 
to be intuitable) it would be Being, not nothingness. In order for it to 
be absolute nothingness, two conditions must be met: (1) it can “exist” 
only to the extent that it is mediated by the self-negation (zange) of the 
relative, and (2) it cannot arise as a simple negation of the relative, but 
rather as its absolute negation in which negation itself is negated in a 
radical affirmation. Since absolute nothingness has no intelligibility or 
existence apart from the death and resurrection of finite subjectivity, in­
stead of Nishida’s metaphor of “place” for absolute nothingness, 
Tanabe speaks of “absolute mediation.”23 Absolute nothingness, as 
religious self-awakening, is realized only in the transforming action of 
other-power. But the “otherness” of tariki cannot place it in opposi­
tion to the relative or else it would not be the true absolute. This point, 
on which Tanabe and Nishida are in agreement, leads Tanabe to speak 
of the mediation of absolute nothingness by relative being, instead of 
its basho, for the metaphor of “place” presumes that the absolute can 
be known noetically in an aesthetic intuition into the undifferentiated 
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immediacy of being when in fact it can be experienced only meta- 
noetically in the transformation of subjectivity by other-power.
Tanabe’s interpretation of absolute nothingness constitutes an im­
portant alternative to Nishida’s views. Although he never mentions 
Nishida by name, that Tanabe has his former teacher in mind is abun­
dantly clear to any reader familiar with Nishida’s work. Three points 
are outstanding.
Most fundamentally, Tanabe criticizes Nishida’s intuitionism for its 
failure to grasp true religious consciousness. If the absolute is in­
tuitable, it can be known noetically in contemplation, or what Tanabe 
calls “ordinary mysticism.” This mysticism is “ordinary” in that (1) it 
takes as its basis the “self-power” (Jiriki) of speculation (e.g. Hegel) 
or ecstasis (e.g. Plotinus) and is aimed at the recovery of lost im­
mediacy to the absolute, (2) it does not require the death and resurrec­
tion of the ego, and (3) it does not arise in the action (event) of other- 
power. As Christianity objects to Plotinian mysticism for replacing the 
radical death of subjectivity symbolized by the cross with a pantheistic 
aesthetic based on an ontology of emanation, so also, Tanabe criticizes 
Nishida’s interpretation of the religious as an intuition into undifferen­
tiated totality.24
24 Ibid., pp. 166-168.
Second, Tanabe criticizes Nishida for not distinguishing himself 
sufficiently from Hegelianism. Hegel recognized the disruption of 
reason in the Kantian antinomies but thought that this disruption 
could be overcome in historical dialectics. Hegel, however, is not dialec­
tical enough for Tanabe. Reason’s contradiction in the opposition of 
thesis and antithesis is resolved in a synthesis that restores reason to its 
former state. This is a disruption, but not the “absolute disruption” 
that constitutes the death and resurrection of reason and lead to its 
transformation. Hegel’s Begriff quite as much as the self-identical 
reason of the Kantian critique, must deny its own innate self-contradic­
tion. In Tanabe’s reading, the Hegelian Aufhebung leads inevitably to 
an intuited totality of Being, not the emptiness (shunyata) of true 
nothingness. Similarly, since Nishida’s dialectic of the “absolutely con­
tradictory self-identity” leads toward aesthetically intuited totality, it 
cannot be accepted as an adequate interpretation of Buddhist 
nothingness. In Tanabe’s view, the negation of negation, understood 
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as the restoration of self-identity25 presumes an aesthetic intuition of be­
ing, not nothingness as transformative power (tariki). Tanabe’s quar­
rel with Nishida parallels somewhat Kierkegaard’s criticism of Hegel. 
Hegel and Nishida presume that truth is a whole which allows it to be 
apprehended and interpreted conceptually through the intuition of 
totality. For Kierkegaard and Tanabe on the other hand, truth is 
fragmented, not total; ironic, not aesthetic. Ultimate truth is known 
only in the death and resurrection of the self that is the hallmark of 
faith, not speculation based on the inherent power of reason for self- 
criticism. It touches the subject intensively, not extensively. It is the 
grace of that which is other than the self (tariki), while not being op­
posable to the self (the absolute mediation of nothingness) and also not 
the achievement of self (jiriki).
25 Ibid., p. 57.
* Ibid., p. 11. Nishida clearly considers it the concrete universal.
27 Ibid., p. 11.
“ Ibid., pp. 18-19.
The third major objection that Tanabe raises against Nishida con­
cerns the suitability of the metaphor “place” for absolute nothingness. 
Tanabe directly contradicts Nishida’s text in rejecting the mu no basho 
as the “abstract universal.’’26 Once again, Tanabe objects that the 
aestheticism and intuitionism implicit in the notion of a basho of 
nothingness cannot account for concretely historical and properly 
ethical existence because it does not take the metanoia of the relative 
and its transformation by other-power as its criteria. Tanabe develops 
his point by drawing on the Pure Land Buddhist doctrines of OsO (go­
ing to the Pure Land) and gensO (the Bodhisattva’s return to this 
world).27 The standpoint of basho lacks the idea of gensO by reason 
of its ethically indeterminate character. Only when the religious is 
understood as the even of other-power can the concrete socio-historical 
“direction of transformation” be determined. Instead of basho, which 
remains in the realm of noetics, Tanabe holds up the meta-noetics of 
“absolute mediation” in which subjectivity is transformed.28 The ab­
solute does not exist as a totality disclosed in an intuition into un­
differentiated experiential immediacy. It has no existence whatsoever 
apart from the finite being of the relative. In place of Nishida’s im­
mediacy and totality, Tanabe argues for a concrete, historical and
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ethical mediation of absolute nothingness without recourse to what is 
in Tanabe’s assessment the abstract universal of “place.”
IV
These deliberations have been guided by a belief that the un­
precedented nature of Whitehead’s metaphysics in the Western intellec­
tual tradition needs to be better appreciated, especially for its post­
modern possibilities, and that this might be achieved by reversing the 
normal procedure of using process metaphysics to interpret Buddhism. 
Reading Whitehead from the perspective of Nishida tetsugaku serves 
to underscore to alien quality of process thought to the Western intellec­
tual tradition by suggesting some Buddhist warrants for its metaphys­
ics and cosmology. If a Buddhist reading of Whitehead highlights the 
distance of his texts from his Western audience, perhaps an interpreta­
tion from the perspective of Tanabe’s religious critique of immediacy 
and totality might lessen this distance by suggesting a way for the West 
to appropriate the post-modern religious vision underlying White­
head’s process cosmology.
Whitehead’s cosmos is not simply the quantum world of Planck, 
Heisenberg and Bohr. It is instead a cosmos fully known only in a 
religious apprehension. Undoubtedly a religious interpretation is re­
quired to account fully for the obstinate interest that we witness late 
in Whitehead’s career regarding the paradoxes of God and world, pri­
mordial and consequent natures of the divine, permanence and flux. 
This point confronts us immediately with the problem of what kind of 
religious apprehension is most suited to Whitehead’s cosmos. In this 
paper, I have argued for the suitability of the Buddhist-oriented phi­
losophy of the Kyoto School for interpreting Whitehead to the West. 
The Kyoto School offers us two figures whose philosophical positions 
are clearly guided by the religious insight of Mahayana Buddhism, 
yet who present differing views on the nature of its religious experience. 
If Nishida’s intuitive religiosity of immediacy and totality helps White­
head’s Western interpreters to appreciate more fully the novelty of 
his metaphysics, perhaps Tanabe’s metanoetic transformation of im­
mediacy and totality will suggest a way for the West to awaken to 
Whitehead’s religious vision.
Whitehead’s cosmos is not the world of the Greek logos. The
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Western intellectual tradition annuls the actuality of the world by 
subordinating the immediacy of experience to what transcends it. 
Dichotomy is introduced into the heart of actuality requiring the world 
to be known as something other than itself: logos. The dichotomy in 
the Western consciousness is reflected in the West’s cosmology as well. 
Creation, object, fact, temporality, etc., appear in the Western cosmos 
as formal opposites of subjectivity.
In the Enlightenment period, this dichotomous cosmos and con­
sciousness was exaggerated through the dialectical use of reason. In 
this respect, modernity presents us with a peculiar gnosticism.29 It is 
gnostic in that it promotes a negative relationship between fact and 
value as a means of denying what Whitehead affirms: the salvation of 
the world by matter-of-fact entities. Process metaphysics underscores 
the gnostic plight of modernity. The dualities of nature and con­
sciousness, God and world, long to be restored to their concrete im­
mediacy and totality. The fact that Nishida’s view regarding the 
“eschatology of the ordinary” seems to be the closest analogue to 
Whitehead’s soteriology suggests once again the possibility that 
Whitehead’s process cosmos can be better understood by the West if it 
turns away from its own modernity and looks to the religious vision of 
Buddhism.
” Eric Voegelin’s famous diagnosis of modernity naturally comes to mind. Without 
wanting to ignore the relationship that may exist between Whitehead’s process 
metaphysics and Voegelin’s ideas regarding the “tension of existence,’’ for present pur­
poses the term “gnosticism” refers simply to the modern separation of fact and value. 
For a discussion of process thought as a critique of gnosticism in this sense, see 
Thomas Altizer, “The Buddhist Ground of Whitehead’s God,” p. 233.
This latter point suggests the appropriateness of appreciating 
Whitehead’s philosophical achievement as a particularly creative and 
singular example of the West’s longing to overcome the self-alienation 
at the heart of its own dualistic subjectivity. Process thought presents 
us with a concrete example of a post-modern cosmology calling for a 
post-modern consciousness. Whitehead’s cosmos arises when the West 
overcomes what it learned during its Enlightenment: “the great refusal 
of rationality to assert its rights.” But it must be noted immediately 
that the rationality Whitehead has in mind is not the Enlightenment’s 
artificially narrowed notion of instrumental reason, but rather a ratio
126
BUDDHIST PATH TO PROCESS THOUGHT 
awakened and transformed by the immediacy and totality of the real. 
If Whitehead’s cosmology arises through the liberation of reason, the 
post-modern consciousness appropriate to this cosmos arises not 
through a direct conceptual application of metaphysics, but through a 
metanoia in which the death and resurrection of reason reflects in for­
mal logic the death and resurrection of subjectivity in the religious ex­
perience of existential transformation.
Thus, Whitehead presents modernity with a new religious language 
which requires the transformation of modernity’s preference for 
criticism. Process and Reality confronts us with a discourse which re­
quires an awakening of subjectivity in order to be fully apprehended. 
In a real sense, Whitehead’s process cosmos will be “known” finally by 
the West only when it practices something akin to Tanabe’s metano- 
etics: i.e., forswearing any claim to establish absolute knowledge 
through criticism in the hope that, through the death and resurrection 
of reason and the transformation of subjectivity, ordinary language 
itself might become the mediation of truth which transcends criticism. 
In fact, Whitehead himself may have been practicing something very 
much akin to Tanabe’s zangedO. Especially in the final part of Process 
and Reality Whitehead seems to move from the establishment of his 
cosmology by means of his metaphysics more and more deeply into 
a critique of this cosmology by means of his religious vision. We wit­
ness, in the final passages of this difficult text, a gradual negation of 
his own categories. In a way that is difficult to reconcile with the re­
flections that have preceeded it, Whitehead claims that “God and 
world stand over against each other ...” even while he asserts that 
“. . . each is all in all.”30 Here, not only the language of dichotomy 
but also the language of totality have undergone a zange in the hope of 
mediating a religious vision whose meaning Whitehead’s cosmology 
does not exhaust. Nishida’s logic of “place” helps us to establish the 
kinship of this cosmology with the Buddhist heritage. Tanabe’s meta- 
noetic logic suggests a way that the post-modern longing of the West 
might find in this cosmos a fulfillment.
30 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 529.
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